I have two works in progress on Leibniz. 

Occasionalism and Causation: I examine Leibniz's flirtation with and ultimate rejection of occasionalism in 1686. In particular, I argue that Leibniz's theory of final causation plays a significant and underappreciated role in his rejection of occasionalism. 

This paper is under review.

Goodness and teleology:  I argue that Leibniz's theory of final causation is more Aristotelian than commentators have generally recognized. In particular, I argue that Leibniz works a robust goodness into his account of final causation, and deploys it effectively against Pierre Bayle. 

This paper is under review.

Shepherd on Ordinary Induction: This paper, co-authored with Travis Tanner, considers Shepherd's response to Hume's riddle of induction. Shepherd's inductive theory has received only limited scholarly attention, and even less attention has thus far been paid to how her solution applies to ordinary cases of induction. We argue that Shepherd, drawing upon a distinction between real and nominal essences, provides a substantive response to Hume, one that plausibly justifies the inductions of the folk in everyday contexts, at least by her own lights. We also shed light on how both Shepherd and Hume are situated within the broader context of enlightened British philosophy and argue, in this context, that Shepherd represents an attempt to defend a more traditional empiricism against the perceived threat of Humean skepticism. 

This paper is under review.

Augustine, Plato, and Plotinus on Visions of the Good: This paper, co-authored with Gabriel Kim, assesses Augustine's encounter with the divine at Ostia. This apparently straightforward encounter, we argue, is actually a significant departure from the traditional, Platonist account. Examining the issue closer, we argue that this departure reveals an important feature of Augustine's theory of education, one with wide-ranging implications for his theological epistemology.

A draft is currently in progress.

Kant, Teleology, and Natural Kinds: Kant's theory of final causation and teleology, especially as it figures in the Critique of Judgement is receiving increasing scholarly attention. I argue that this theory of natural purposes inextricably relies on Kant's theory of divine purposes. In particular, I argue that Kant invokes divine purposes in his discussion of natural teleology because biological species are natural kinds, and that natural kinds are best understood as something similar to divine concepts. We deploy natural kinds, which we regulatively assume can only be created by God, in order to advance our aims in science. So, I will argue, there is a natural connection between natural kinds and species-perpetuation that makes good sense of why Kant insists that we must think of biological organisms as supernaturally designed. 

A draft is currently in progress.